

1981

**MEMORANDUM**

**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

**SECRET**

April 10, 1973

*Note by HAK*

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER**

**FROM:**

Jeanne W. Davis

**SUBJECT:**

Talker for Breakfast Meeting with  
Secretary Richardson, Wednesday,  
April 11

Phil Odeen has prepared a talker at Tab I for your meeting with Secretary Richardson covering the status of various NSSMs and the timing of ongoing NSC work, MBFR and SALT.

In addition, several other staff members have suggested items you may wish to discuss (Tab II).

**Attachments**

**NSS, OSD Reviews Completed**

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## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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April 10, 1973

## MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM:

Phil Odeon *W*

SUBJECT:

Breakfast With Secretary Richardson

You are scheduled to have breakfast with Secretary Richardson on Wednesday, April 11. These talking points cover (1) Status of NSSMs on NATO, Naval Forces, Nuclear Policy and Asian Strategy, (2) MBFR, and (3) SALT. Some thoughts on the timing of on-going NSC work are also included.

NSSM 168 - NATO

The review of our ability along with that of our Allies to implement our strategy for NATO is receiving full support from DOD although it is too early to judge the quality of the work. A series of eight papers covering the various aspects of the problem have been developed, reviewed by the working group and are being revised. The four key papers (1) Estimates of our ability to implement a conventional defense, (2) Force improvements for our Allies and deployed U.S. forces (3) NATO mobilization and reinforcement capability, and (4) Theater nuclear strategy are undergoing major revision and the usefulness of the study will depend on their contributions.

DOD is giving this study good support. However you could stress the importance of developing a good understanding of the force improvement we want our Allies to undertake, as well as ways we can enhance the effectiveness of our forces in Europe and our ability to reinforce more rapidly.

Discussed \_\_\_\_\_

Did Not Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

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NSSM 177 - NAVAL FORCES

Secretary Richardson has proposed that the following parts of the Naval Forces study be completed by July 1: (1) an analysis of the Soviet Naval threat; (2) the diplomatic impact of Soviet naval deployments; and (3) areas where we may be unilaterally involved and could face Soviet naval forces. He proposes delaying the (1) analysis of the adequacy of U.S. force levels; (2) evaluation of the future role of the carrier; and, (3) alternative means of supporting naval missions which involve naval forces until well beyond next summer. This would mean that the NSSM could not affect the review of the FY 75-80 Defense program.

I believe the Richardson proposal is unacceptable. It delays all of the really substantive work and in essence only completes those aspects that are primarily the responsibility of State and CIA. You have a memo which asks Richardson to complete an analysis of the adequacy of current and planned U.S. forces by mid-summer. It agrees to delay the analysis of alternative ways to support missions involving naval forces because this very contentious area could undercut meaningful progress on the rest of the study.

I recommend you stress the interest of the President in this study and after discussing it with Richardson sign the memo (Tab A) to him.

Discussed \_\_\_\_\_

Did Not Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

NSSM 169 - NUCLEAR POLICY

The review of U.S. nuclear policy, including the DOD work on targeting, is proceeding somewhat slowly, but it should be ready for review within two or three weeks. The study group, which is chaired by Johnny Foster, has prepared a second draft of the Summary Report. The draft still has many shortcomings, and we expect to have an improved version out next week to serve as a basis for the final review. The study focuses on employment policy (targeting) and declaratory policy, in particular, how we explain our new policy to the European Allies. State has taken the lead on this aspect and prepared a useful paper.

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I see no need for you to raise this with Richardson as the work is proceeding adequately. But if it does come up, you should stress the importance of this work and the fact that it will receive careful attention by the DPRC and the President.

Discussed \_\_\_\_\_ Did Not Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

NSSM 170 - ASIAN STRATEGY

Work on the Asian Strategy NSSM is almost complete. This study will give the President a forum to decide our long-term post-war Asian deployments, the broad objectives of our security assistance in Asia, and the resultant impact on long-term U.S. force planning. The conventional force work is good, and the nuclear work lays broad roles for these weapons in a useful way. But it does not give us a detailed look at the specific ways tactical nuclear weapons would be used in support of conventional forces.

You may want to stress to Richardson the need to improve our knowledge of tactical nuclear weapons and actual ways they could be used to support conventional forces.

Discussed \_\_\_\_\_ Did Not Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

Finally, Richardson may bring up the Defense Planning study which asks for analysis of strategic and general purpose force modernization programs and their consistency with planned future force levels. Action has been given to Systems Analysis, but I do not believe work has started.

You may want to stress the need to get the review to the DPRC before June and the start of the budget review process (both studies are due May 1).

MBFR

You might raise with Richardson the issues that you plan to bring up at the NSC meeting on Thursday, with the object of getting his views on them.

-- Linkage between force improvement and MBFR.

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-- The acceptability of the three options developed by the Working Group.

-- How these should be presented to NATO and whether we should state a preference or not.

In particular, you might press Richardson to outline how he plans to handle the force improvement issue with the Defense Planning Committee later this spring. Regardless of what we say in the context of MBFR proposals, it is important that Richardson take a strong position with our Allies.

You might also discuss how MBFR can assist us with our Congressional problem regarding troops in Europe. NATO has been the principal subject that Richardson was questioned on during his Committee appearances in support of the Defense program.

You might also mention the NATO Balance of Payments Offset Study (NSSM 170) and ask his views on how this effort can help us with our problem with the Congress. You should point to the potential problem we face in determining the priority to give to Allied force improvements as opposed to greater efforts on their part to offset our foreign exchange policy.

Discussed \_\_\_\_\_

Did Not Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

SALT

You should press Richardson to give you his views on how we should handle MIRV issues. Does he still believe that we should ignore the MIRV issue and concentrate on an agreement that gives us equal numbers and equal throw weights? Does he appreciate the impact, politically and psychologically, as well as the pressures for new programs, if the Soviets develop and test a MIRV for their big missiles? If Richardson indicates willingness to explore the MIRV issue with the Soviets, you should make it clear that, while we may start with an ICBM MIRV freeze, this approach is unlikely to be negotiable. Therefore, does he agree that some type of equal MIRV limits would be an acceptable outcome if agreed to in the context of Soviet agreement to negotiate an equal central system aggregate?

Discussed \_\_\_\_\_

Did Not Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

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TIMING OF ONGOING NSC WORK

The last time you met with Richardson he indicated that he wished to revise the schedules for several of the NSSMs and other work that is underway within the NSC system. In part, this is to give him more time to focus on the substance and in part to relate the schedules to other ongoing DOD work. If he raises this subject, you should ask him for a specific set of proposals which we can address in light of other priorities and issues. But there are certain considerations that you might raise if the issue is discussed.

-- The NATO work needs to be completed within the next month so that the results will be available as part of our MBFR approach as well as being available for the Ministerial meetings which will take place in early June.

-- The nuclear policy work is time urgent in the sense that we need to understand our nuclear policy as a basis for SALT decisions.

-- The naval forces study as well as the work on general purpose and strategic forces that was requested for DRPC review, should be completed in time so that it can be considered when the DRPC addresses the five-year DOD program this summer.

Discussed \_\_\_\_\_

Did Not Discuss \_\_\_\_\_

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NSSM 177 - Military Missions Involving Naval Forces

As you may know, the President first asked for a detailed analysis of the implications of the Soviet naval threat in February 1971. At that time Defense promised that work would be started immediately and that these issues would be examined in a report submitted for Presidential review. This work was never completed. I am, therefore, concerned to learn that you now believe it will be possible to complete only a limited portion of the naval forces study by this summer.

The careful evaluation of the military and diplomatic significance of Soviet naval threat which you believe can be completed by July will be a major contribution towards understanding the appropriate U. S. military and diplomatic response. However, even this will be incomplete unless the analysis also evaluates the adequacy of the current and planned U. S. forces against the projected Soviet threat. In addition, I believe it is imperative that we improve our understanding of the future role of the aircraft carrier. Without this analysis, we will have an inadequate basis for conducting a thorough review of the capability of planned U. S. forces to support our future strategy.

I, therefore, believe it essential that we at least have an analysis of the adequacy of current and planned U. S. forces by mid-summer for consideration by the time the DPRC reviews the FY 75-80 Defense program. In order to accomplish this, the detailed analyses of alternative ways to support our national objectives called for in paragraph three of the NSSM could probably be postponed beyond the July 1 due date and completed by late summer or early fall.

Henry A. Kissinger